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Abstract
Hackers frequently use social engineering attacks to gain a foothold into a target network.
This type of attack is a tremendous challenge to defend against, as the weakness lies in the
human users, not in the technology. Thus far, methods for dealing with this threat have
included establishing better security policies and educating users on the threat that exists.
Existing techniques aren’t working as evidenced by the fact that auditing agencies consider it
a given that will be able to gain access via social engineering. The purpose of this research is
to propose a better method of reducing an individual’s vulnerability to social engineering
attacks.
The first part of the research formally establishes the connection between social engineering
attacks and what social psychologists call, “illegitimate persuasion” using content analysis to
show that both target the same common psychological triggers. This comparison is done by
comparing specific examples in different mediums. Once this connection is established, this
research also proposes how to apply specific techniques that have been shown to be effective
in increasing an individual’s resistance to persuasion. Specifically, it uses techniques that
have been shown to be effective in bolstering an individual’s resistance illegitimate
persuasion. The research culminates in the proposal of a template for a training program
using these new techniques that can be incorporated into existing training classes that should
significantly reduce an individual’s vulnerability to social engineering attacks.
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ESTABLISHING THE HUMAN FIREWALL: REDUCING AN INDIVIDUAL’S
VULNERABILITY TO SOCIAL ENGINEERING
I. Introduction
1.1

Overview
Human users are the weakest link in any given information security system (Mitnick and

Simon, 2002); they can be deceived, tricked, and manipulated into circumventing the security
protocols in place. As technology progresses, it is this human weakness that remains the
most challenging aspect of system security. Mitnick describes the techniques used to exploit
this human vulnerability to bypass security systems in order to gather information as “social
engineering” (Mitnick and Simon, 2002).

Human users create holes in even the most

expensive and well thought-out hardware and software protection system to such a point that,
when conducting an audit of a company’s information security policies, some security
consultants consider it a given that they would be able to gain access to guarded information
via social engineering (Gragg, 2003). Each new generation of technology promises a new
and improved level of security, but as Peltier points out, the 1970s promised access control
packages to make systems secure, the 1980s promised that effective anti-virus software
would make systems secure, the 1990s promised that firewalls would make systems secure,
and here in the 21st century, the promise is that intrusion detection systems and public key
infrastructure are what’s going to make our systems secure (Peltier, 2006). All may prove
ineffective as attack technologies and techniques continue to evolve and adapt to new
technology, but one method of attacking a network has remained constant, the attack on the
users. As security technology improves its ability to keep out those who would infiltrate the
network, perpetrators likely will simply shift their focus to the human user in order to gain
access. Ironically, this human aspect of security has in the past been largely ignored or
1

downplayed as being too difficult a problem to solve. The purpose of this thesis is to develop
a means of framing and solving the social engineering problem.
1.2

Recognizing the Threat
Many organizations, including the Air Force, use vulnerability assessment teams that use

all the tricks and tactics that a perpetrator would to conduct internal audits on their defenses.
These so-called “red teams” almost always use social engineering techniques to create an
initial point of entry into a network and then use that entry point as a jumping off point in
order to work their way further in the organization’s physical and network resources. Once
inside, the red teams can extract information or plant programs that create backdoors into the
network for later use. Anecdotal evidence from interviews with past and present members of
these red teams has indicated that these teams gain access to a network 100 percent of the
time via social engineering techniques—social engineering always works! The threat of
social engineering cannot be overstated, as it is an insidious, difficult-to-detect method of
gaining access to information or resources that otherwise would be considered well-protected.
An attack may consist of gaining seemingly innocuous information, combining it with
seemingly innocuous information gathered from another source and suddenly some critical
bit of information is revealed than can be used to exploit even more information from an
unsuspecting user. This linkage can be seen in Figure 1, an illustration from a 1995 article on
social engineering by Winkler and Dealy (1995). What this image helps to illustrate is that a
determined social engineer is rarely after a single piece of information, but rather gathers
what she can, when she can and then combines the collected pieces of information into a
potential attack vector.

2

FIGURE 1: ANATOMY OF AN ATTACK (WINKLER AND DEALY, 1995)

1.3

Psychology and Social Engineering
The exact tactics and techniques used by social engineers are constantly evolving, but the

common thread among the many techniques of social engineering is that they target certain
“psychological triggers” to accomplish their objectives (Gragg, 2003, Rusch, 1999). Trade
literature and general practitioner attitudes highlight the importance of user education and
strong security policies as primary methods for defense against social engineering attacks
(Gragg, 2003, Granger, 2002, Mitnick and Simon, 2002), but the continuing vulnerability of
organizations despite the implementation of these policies indicate that something further is
needed. Additional methods to combat social engineering are clearly needed, and need to be
fielded as soon as possible. One area of study that may help in uncovering a better method of
combating social engineering is the field of psychology, specifically social psychology.

3

Gragg (2003) has described several psychological triggers or vulnerabilities that social
engineers exploit to create an emotional state in an individual that leaves them willing to
grant access to information that would otherwise be protected. Inherent in the use of these
triggers is deception. In almost every social engineering attack, the perpetrator wants the
victim to believe the perpetrator is someone they are not. Similarly, a form of persuasion that
has been termed “illegitimate persuasion” by Dr. Brad Sagarin and his colleagues, is when a
message seeks “to convince through the use of deceptive tactics” such as having an actor
dressed as a stock broker who recommends a particular brokerage firm, when in fact, the
actor has no specific expertise to make such a recommendation (Sagarin et al., 2002). This
concept dovetails well with the definition of social engineering. A key difference is that with
illegitimate persuasion, the objective typically is to convince an individual to buy something,
whereas with social engineering, the desired objective is convincing an individual to reveal
sensitive information or bypass established security controls.
1.4

Resistance to Persuasion & Social Engineering

Persuasion is fundamental to human interaction, and social psychologists have long been
interested in understanding which persuasive tactics are effective and why. Considerable
research has looked at the forms of persuasion (Cialdini, 1993, Cialdini, 2001), while in
contrast, relatively few have examined persuasion defenses. The forms of defense against
persuasion that have been defined are based largely on the work of McGuire, who proposed
an inoculation defense (McGuire, 1964), as well as research done by Petty and Caciappo on
forewarning (Petty and Caciappo, 1977). Of these two persuasion defense theories, the
inoculation theory appears to have possible applications to building a defense against social
engineering. McGuire’s inoculation theory suggests that individuals become resistant to
4

social influences when they are exposed to less severe threats, and mirrors the medical
practice of exposing a patient to a reduced concentration of a disease to build up antibodies to
counter that disease. Moreover, an extension of McGuire’s inoculation theory has been
effective against illegitimate persuasion in an experimental setting (Sagarin et al., 2002)
which showed that dispelling any illusions of invulnerability that an individual has is
necessary to increasing an individual’s resistance.
1.5

Academic Challenges of Studying Social Engineering
While trade literature on social engineering is plentiful, the topic is a difficult problem to

tackle in an academic setting. Techniques of social engineering are observed only after an
attack has been attempted and detected, which often makes it difficult to consult the
perpetrator on his cognitive processes leading up to the attack. There is also the problem that
successful attacks may never be detected, and therefore the technique for such an attack
might never be revealed. This is why material from reformed former practitioners of social
engineering, such as Kevin Mitnick, is so valuable. Research can also run into ethical issues,
as human subject testing review boards tend to frown on experiments that, as a fundamental
part of the experiment, seek to deceive the participants as to the true nature of the study.
Also, any research of a phenomenon requires an effective measurement tool, and while one
has been proposed for social engineering (Nohlberg, 2005), it is problematic in that it requires
the users to be deceived as to the true nature of the study, and that it has yet to be validated
through repeated experiments. That problem may not be able to be easily overcome, as
deception is central to the success of social engineering, and it is the individual’s
susceptibility to deception that a researcher would be trying to obtain. Without an effective
measurement instrument, it becomes quite difficult for researchers to determine whether a
proposed defensive mechanism is effective, because there is no means to compare the before
5

and after. The cumulative effect of all these challenges combined has left the academic
literature on social engineering a relatively barren landscape.
1.6

Purpose Statement
Given the relative dearth of research in social engineering when compared to the research

on persuasion, research that defines the relationship between social engineering and
illegitimate persuasion might allow techniques described by researchers on how to bolster an
individual’s resistance to illegitimate persuasion to be applied towards increasing an
individual’s resistance to social engineering. The first purpose of this paper is to establish a
link between social engineering and illegitimate persuasion. If this link can be established, it
stands to reason that techniques demonstrated in social psychology to be effective against
illegitimate persuasion can be incorporated into a training program that can be expected to
increase an individual’s resistance to social engineering. If the link is shown to be weak or
non-existent, then another approach to developing a program to reduce the organization’s
vulnerability to social engineering attacks will need to be developed.
1.7

Thesis Organization
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter two reviews a variety of relevant research

that has been done on social engineering, persuasion and resistance to persuasion. Chapter
three details the comparison that was made between social engineering and illegitimate
persuasion.

Chapter four outlines how techniques designed to reduce an individual’s

vulnerability to a social engineering attempt can be applied from research on persuasion.
Chapter five discusses areas for follow up study as well as potential other areas of application
for this research.

6

II. Literature Review
This chapter is an overview of the concepts associated with social engineering and
persuasion. First, the background of social engineering and how psychology previously has
been researched in relation to social engineering is reviewed. Persuasion models are then
reviewed to give some background on how persuasion might tie into social engineering.
Finally, literature that deals specifically on how to develop a resistance to persuasion is
reviewed for its potential applicability to social engineering.
2.1

What is meant by the term, “Social Engineering”?
Social engineering has been broadly defined as a set of behaviors used by criminals to

surreptitiously gain access to proprietary and confidential information systems (Chantler and
Broadhurst, 2006, Granger, 2001). Some behaviors defined as social engineering may be
unobtrusive, with no personal interaction occurring between the perpetrator and the
information system user. Some examples of unobtrusive behavior that can be labeled as
social engineering include dumpster diving and reading the names off a building’s
information board.

While these activities may fit into the broad definition of social

engineering, this paper will focus on social engineering behaviors that are more obtrusive,
where the perpetrator interacts directly with the victim, using psychological tricks or
manipulations to deceive the victim into volunteering information or somehow yielding
access to the system. This kind of social engineering can be anything from an authoritative
phone call placed to an unsuspecting user, to impersonating tech support and paying a
personal visit to “install the latest patches.” For the purposes of this paper, the definition of
social engineering will refer to this personal approach to social engineering, for two reasons.
First, it is the more insidious and pervasive type of social engineering security professionals
7

face today and second, it is the one that might be effectively countered with the appropriate
level of training and education.
2.2

Trade Literature and Social Engineering
Much has been written in trade literature about social engineering. Works such as

Granger’s articles on securityfocus.com (2001, 2002, 2006), Gragg’s article published by the
SANS Institute (Gragg, 2003), and a book by one of the most infamous hackers that has since
reformed, Kevin Mitnick (Mitnick and Simon, 2002), clearly define the threat that
organizations face when trying to protect sensitive information. Mitnick, in particular, offers
numerous anecdotes to illustrate the various techniques and methods that a social engineer
can employ to gather the sought-after information (Mitnick and Simon, 2002). While most
trade literature on social engineering does an excellent job of outlining the threat that is faced,
the techniques described to combat the threat are fairly universal throughout trade literature.
2.3

Current Preventive Techniques are Inadequate
The universal theme in the trade literature is that social engineering is a problem that is

never given enough attention by organizational decision makers (Granger, 2006, Peltier,
2006) and that the best way to defend against it is through user awareness and stringent
security policies (Chantler and Broadhurst, 2006, Gragg, 2003, Granger, 2006, Mitnick and
Simon, 2002, Peltier, 2006, Rusch, 1999). Authors such as Thornburgh emphasize welldefined policies that establishes an information classification system that clearly defines not
only what information can be disclosed but to whom and by whom as well as education
policies that instruct users about what information a social engineer can use, how she gains it,
and how it can be used towards nefarious ends (Thornburgh, 2004). While these programs
and policies certainly are useful at face value in developing a defense against social
8

engineering, the problem is that they have been shown to be inadequate, to the point that
many security consultants consider it a given that they will be able to access critical
information via social engineering (Gragg, 2003). This is backed up from discussions with
individuals of red teams who engage in social engineering behaviors regularly in the course
of their attempts to penetrate a network, and who reveal that their attempts to gain
information and/or access via social engineering are effective 100 percent of the time.
Usually the victims are all too willing to give up the desired information, and the few who
actually do challenge the red teams are usually circumvented simply by changing the attack
vector, either by attacking another individual, or by switching tactics.
2.4

Psychological Triggers Introduced
Several researchers have tried to better understand why current efforts are inadequate

against the threat of social engineering.

Some of these efforts have focused on the

psychological vulnerabilities of individuals (Chantler and Broadhurst, 2006, Gragg, 2003,
Rusch, 1999). Gragg (2003) perhaps made the largest contribution to the literature on the
psychological aspects of social engineering when he defined seven psychological triggers that
perpetrators can potentially use to manipulate a victim into revealing the desired information.
He labeled these triggers as follows: strong affect, overloading, reciprocation, deceptive
relationships, diffusion of responsibility, authority, and integrity and consistency. Gaining an
understanding of these triggers as well as the techniques used to carry out a social
engineering attack is fundamental to being able to develop a defense against the pervasive
threat of social engineering.
These triggers are all based on deception, and used by a perpetrator towards a single end:
convincing the victim that his or her intentions are benevolent and should be trusted. Once
9

the victim is sufficiently convinced, the perpetrator generally has no problems obtaining the
desired information from the victim. Persuasion and deception are central to a successful
social engineering attack, and for that reason, understanding persuasion, deception, and the
resistance of persuasion is central to finding an effective defense against social engineering.
An investigation into social psychology may reveal the best answer as to why previous
methods of instilling a resistance to social engineering have proved inadequate and to how
best combat the threat of social engineering.
2.5

Cialdini and the Six Principles of Persuasion
When studying the effects and methods of persuasion, researchers over the years have

given priority to the study of successful persuasion (getting someone to say yes), rather than
on the study of resistance to persuasion (getting someone to say no). This is primarily due to
an overwhelming interest and sponsorship by advertisers in getting the individual to say yes
to a particular product or service. One of the results of such work on persuasion was
Cialdini’s (1993, 2001) six persuasion principles that can be used to describe nearly any
attempt at persuasion.

These principles describe the tendency of individuals to react

favorably to stimuli related to each principle. These principles have been described as
“heuristic rules” that can assist individuals in their decision whether or not to comply with a
request (Cialdini, 1993). The six principles described by Cialdini are authority, consistency,
liking, reciprocity, scarcity, and social proof. The following paragraph describes each in
more detail.
The principle of authority states that when making a decision, it is common to look to
expert advice from an acknowledged source. Authority can be represented effectively simply
through the external appearance of authority through specific symbols, such as a uniform,
10

professional title, etc (Bickman, 1974). Another factor that can affect the likelihood of
compliance is the legitimacy and credibility of the authority figure.

The principle of

consistency is based on the desire of individuals to uphold their stated commitments. This
tendency is even stronger when a person’s values are identified first and the communicator is
then able to point out that the request is consistent with those values (Cialdini, 2001). People
feel obligated to back up their initial commitment with action, and this tendency can be used
as a means of persuasion. The principle of liking refers to the tendency of people to respond
positively to a request from someone they like. There are numerous factors that can enhance
the effect, such as similarity of attitude, background, physical attractiveness, dress, and the
use of praise (Cialdini, 1993). The principle of reciprocity is based on the tendency of
individuals to respond in kind when positive behavior is received, such as the giving of gifts,
favors, or services. The principle of scarcity refers to the fact that as items or opportunities
are perceived to be more scarce, they are perceived to be more valuable, and thus can be
leveraged into convincing an individual into a course of action. The last principle that
Cialdini describes is the principle of social proof, which refers to the tendency of people to
follow the lead of their peers, and that others’ standards are often adopted as an individual’s
own. This can be leveraged into a willingness to comply with a request when supported by
the belief that similar peers comply with it as well. These six principles appear to have some
significant overlaps with Gragg’s psychological triggers. Cialdini’s principles and Gragg’s
triggers are compared in depth and in parallel in chapter four.
2.6

Resistance to Persuasion
Given the focus of this research, our emphasis will be on demonstrated methods for

resisting persuasion.

Tormala and Petty (2004) define resistance to persuasion as “the

process of defending one’s attitude against persuasive attack.” Other mechanisms through
11

which individuals resist persuasion that have been studied include counter arguing, which
Brock described as the “act of generating behavioral cognitive responses against a message”
(Brock, 1967). Lydon, Zanna, and Ross (1988) contributed to the resistance to persuasion
literature by showing that it was related to bolstering an individual’s initial attitudes. It has
also been shown that individuals resist persuasion when they have been forewarned
(Papageorgis, 1968, Petty and Caciappo, 1977), and when they have been previously exposed
to initial attacks of persuasion (McGuire, 1964).
More recently, Tormala and Petty (2002) showed that when individuals resist a
persuasive attack, those attacks can actually make the target’s ability to resist attack stronger
than it already was.

These finding were consistent with McGuire’s inoculation theory

(McGuire, 1964), which showed that exposure to an initial persuasive attack can increase an
individual’s resistance to subsequent attacks.

McGuire’s research focused on cultural

truisms, which he believed to be a particular vulnerable set of beliefs that people had little
experience defending against. He found that individuals who were given the motivation to
defend their attitudes, and the ability to do so effectively by a defense that effectively refuted
a weakened argument for a cultural truism, were much more likely to have a significant and
long-lasting resistance.

McGuire’s research assumed, though, that initial attitudes were

unchanged. Where Tormala and Petty differ is when they showed that those initial attitudes
do indeed change, and that the credibility of the source of a persuasive attack affects the
predictability of an individual being able to resist a persuasive attack (Tormala and Petty,
2004).
Tormala and Petty demonstrated (2004) that when an attack from what is perceived to be
an expert is successfully resisted, an individual’s attitude of certainty of being able to resist
12

future attack is increased.

When applied towards training individuals and creating a

predictable behavior in them, this increased certainty could be useful, leading trainees to a
sense of invulnerability.

According to Sagarin, et al (2002), the greatest increase in

resistance occurs when that sense of invulnerability is shown to be erroneous. Sagarin and
his colleagues expanded on McGuire’s inoculation theory, and demonstrated in a series of
three experiments that instilling resistance requires more than just asserting an individual’s
vulnerability.

Instead, the individual’s vulnerability must be demonstrated in order to

significantly increase their resistance—that is, the person must have an “a ha!” moment.
Applying this technique to social engineering, means that in order to effectively train an
individual to be resistant to social engineering, that individual must be shown that he or she is
vulnerable to the techniques used by social engineers. Using the techniques developed by
Tormala and Petty to ensure that an individual is confident in their ability to resist an expertly
executed persuasive attack, and thus seemingly invulnerable to further attacks sets a perfect
stage for dispelling that illusion of invulnerability and thus increasing their resistance to
further persuasion.
Sagarin and his colleagues conducted three different experiments on resistance to
illegitimate persuasion, and the results of each experiment has lessons that can be used
towards instilling a resistance to social engineering (Sagarin et al., 2002). I will take a
moment here to describe the experiments, the results of each, and the potential application to
social engineering.
2.7

Sagarin’s Experiments and Their Application to Social Engineering
The first experiment attempted to “instill resistance by teaching participants a rule for

discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate appeals and by suggesting to participants
13

that ads containing illegitimate authorities are attempts to deceive consumers” (Sagarin et al.,
2002). The results of this experiment suggested that simply giving trainees a discriminating
rule did not make them significantly more resistant to an authority-based appeal.

The

participants did become more discriminating about discerning an illegitimate authority from a
legitimate authority, but the experiment rather showed that legitimate authorities came to be
seen as more persuasive, rather than instilling a strong resistance against illegitimate
authorities (Sagarin et al., 2002). The extension and application for this finding for the
purposes of training individuals about social engineering is that teaching individuals about
the various psychological triggers simply isn’t enough to instill an effective resistance and
defense to social engineering. This finding explains why education programs that simply
seek to inform the user about the dangers of social engineering have proven ineffective.
The second experiment that Sagarin and his colleagues conducted essentially replicated
the first experiment, with one key difference: persistence of the desired effect over time
(Sagarin et al., 2002).

In addition to testing the participants’ resistance to illegitimate

persuasion immediately after applying their treatment, the second experiment also tested the
participants’ resistance one to four days after the treatment was applied. The findings of this
second experiment matched the findings of the first experiment in that the participants were
found not to have as much an increase in resistance against illegitimate authorities as an
increased perception that the legitimate authority was more persuasive. The participants who
received the treatment did not resist illegitimate authorities more effectively than did the
controls (Sagarin et al., 2002). For the purpose of applying Sagarin’s techniques to social
engineering, there were two important findings from the second experiment. First, the effects
of the treatment did appear to persist over time (Sagarin et al., 2002). That the effects
persisted over time suggests that a more formal, interactive training program against social
14

engineering could be effective for a time after being taught. Second, that the participants
appeared to recognize the characterization of illegitimacy in the treatment, but appeared to
believe themselves unsusceptible to its effects and thus did not act on it (Sagarin et al., 2002).
This illusion of invulnerability has been studied in areas from contraception (Burger and
Burns, 1988), to mental health (Taylor and Gollwitzer, 1995), to preventative health
behaviors (Weinstein, 1987) and has been found to persist even to the individual’s detriment.
This illusion of invulnerability helps to explain why individuals continue to be vulnerable to
social engineering attacks even after the current techniques of training are administered.
The third experiment that Sagarin and his colleagues conducted sought to dispel these
illusions of invulnerability by demonstrating to the participants who had been persuaded by
an illegitimate authority that they had been fooled (Sagarin et al., 2002). By pointing out to
the participants that they had been duped, the participants learned that they were personally
susceptible to the risk of illegitimate persuasion. The results of the experiment suggested that
participants who had their personal vulnerability demonstrated to them were significantly
more resistant to ads containing illegitimate authorities than those who did not have their
personal vulnerability demonstrated, and were again more persuaded by legitimate
authorities. This experiment was the first time in the series of experiments that the resistance
effect was of greater magnitude than the enhancement effect (Sagarin et al., 2002). This
demonstrated conclusively that instilling resistance required more than merely asserting an
individual’s vulnerability; it requires a clear demonstration of this vulnerability (Sagarin et
al., 2002).
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III. Methodology
This chapter outlines the methodology used to formally compare social engineering and
illegitimate persuasion. It provides the necessary information to formalize the relationship in
a systematic and definable manner.
3.1

Problem Definition
This research addresses two specific areas of concern about social engineering:

determining whether or not social engineering can be equated to illegitimate persuasion, and
how to apply techniques shown to be effective against illegitimate persuasion to the problem
of training someone to be resistant to social engineering.
3.2

Goals
In order to be able to apply Sagarin’s work on illegitimate persuasion to social

engineering, the goal of this research is to determine whether or not social engineering is
actually comparable enough to illegitimate persuasion to be able to make the transfer of this
application to social engineering.
3.3

Approach
This comparison was performed in two phases. First, Gragg’s psychological triggers

were directly compared to Cialdini’s principles of persuasion. This was done to determine
whether techniques of persuasion are the same as the techniques of social engineering. Then
in the second phase, a systematic, progressive comparison was performed between each of
the following aspects of the two: definitions, targets, objectives, and methods of illegitimate
persuasion and social engineering, as shown in Figure 2. The experiments that Sagarin and
his colleagues performed during their research on illegitimate persuasion are analyzed for the
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principles of persuasion methods that they used, and for the comparable psychological
triggers that were used. One set of experiments focused on the persuasion principle of
authority, while the other experiment focused on the principle of scarcity. If the principle of
dispelling the illusion of invulnerability works against two separate principles of persuasion,
and those principles of persuasion are equated to the psychological triggers of social
engineering, then the principle of dispelling the illusion of invulnerability should be
applicable to all of the principles of persuasion and, by extension, any psychological triggers
that the principles of persuasion are found to be the same as.

FIGURE 2: COMPARISON METHODOLOGY

This comparison sets the foundation for the training proposal that follows in chapter five
and would indicate that the development of a training program designed to instill a resistance
to social engineering based on Sagarin’s principles of dispelling the illusion of invulnerability
in individuals is a viable method of reducing an individual’s resistance to social engineering.
This type of training would be a revolutionary approach to developing a defense against
social engineering, which up to this point has involved comprehensive security policies and
education on the methods of techniques and tactics of social engineers, but the current
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education plans does not address what is a necessary step towards increasing someone’s
resistance to a social engineering attempt: the cognitive recognition by the individual that
they are vulnerable to the techniques and tactics commonly used by social engineers, and that
the information that individual possesses is valuable to a social engineer, and likely to be
targeted.

18

IV. Results and Analysis
4.1

Comparing Psychological Triggers to Principles of Persuasion
In order to compare Gragg’s psychological triggers to Cialdini’s principles of persuasion,

each of Cialdini’s principles will be described, followed by any comparable trigger that
Gragg describes.

This comparison will assist in the analysis of the methods of both

illegitimate persuasion and social engineering. Gragg describes seven psychological triggers
of social engineering, while Cialdini describes six principles of persuasion, shown in Figure
3.

FIGURE 3: CIALDINI'S PRINCIPLES OF PERSUASION & GRAGG'S PSYCHOLOGICAL TRIGGERS

The first psychological trigger described by Gragg is strong affect (Gragg, 2003). This is
a technique that uses a heightened emotional state that allows the perpetrator to get
information from a victim that would not normally be released. According to Gragg (2003),
when employing this technique, the perpetrator will trigger the desired emotion, such as
greed, at the outset of the encounter to distract the victim, and interfere with their ability to
evaluate, think logically, or develop counterarguments.
19

A good example of a social

engineering attack that uses principles of strong affect is the classic phishing attack that
claims that a user’s banking account information has been compromised. The strong affect
emotion this type of attack seeks to elicit is one of fear that their financial information is in
the hands of a thief.
The first principle of persuasion that was examined was the principle of scarcity
(Cialdini, 2001). Scarcity refers to the natural inclination to desire things that are rare or
scarce. It can also refer to the desire to miss out on future opportunities. An example of a
persuasion attempt that uses the principle of scarcity is an advertisement that touts a “limitedtime offer” or “while supplies last.” The implication of these examples is that there is a finite
amount of time that the product will be available, and any purchase of said product should be
done quickly. Like the social engineer in Gragg’s trigger of strong affect, an advertiser who
uses the scarcity principle to persuade is hoping to elicit a strong emotion that temporarily
impairs their judgment. In analyzing the relationship between the trigger of strong affect and
the principle of scarcity, it would seem that strong affect can be more broadly applied, and
that nearly every circumstance of scarcity fits into the trigger of strong affect.
The second trigger Gragg describes is overloading; this is a technique where the
perpetrator presents false premises that are laced with convincing truisms to the victim in
such rapid succession that the victim becomes mentally passive or when a perpetrator argues
from an unexpected perspective and the victim becomes more willing to accept arguments
that should have been challenged (Gragg, 2003).

There is a time element with the

overloading trigger during which the victim is either passive or compliant and the perpetrator
acts quickly to take advantage of the victim’s reduced motivation to resist. This attack is
usually conducted over the phone or, even better, in person to reduce the victim’s ability to
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react and retreat before being forced into making a decision. It can also be used to gain
compliance in a small task and set up an attack using a different trigger (such as
reciprocation). None of Cialdini’s principles of persuasion appear to match this trigger.
The third trigger that Gragg describes is that of reciprocation, a technique based on the
idea of social exchange where individuals feel obligated to reciprocate a kind gesture from
someone else (Gragg, 2003). Also referred to as “reverse social engineering” (Granger,
2001), an example of this type of reciprocation is when the perpetrator creates an IT problem
that baffles the user, but he or she just happens to be able to fix. When the perpetrator
voluntarily helps to fix the problem, he or she asks the victim to reciprocate by innocently
requesting otherwise guarded information.
Reciprocation is a well-established persuasion principle, and is described by Cialdini
using the exact same term (Cialdini, 2001). He describes it as a response to positive behavior
with positive behavior return, linked to the human need to establish strong social networks
(Cialdini, 2001). The caveat with this principle is that according to Brehm’s theory of
reactance, the initial behavior has to appear genuine, given upfront, and unconditionally or
the recipient quickly becomes defensive and guarded (Brehm, 1966).
The fourth trigger that Gragg describes is the deceptive relationship, a technique where
the perpetrator purposefully builds up a relationship with the intent to eventually extract
information out of the victim(s) (Gragg, 2003). Mitnick and Simon (Mitnick and Simon,
2002) describe deceptive relationships with an anecdote where an employee who already was
suspicious of Mitnick in a different context was conned. Mitnick took on an alias via email
and developed a relationship with the employee by sharing with the employee his distrust and
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negative impressions of “Kevin Mitnick”. With an established relationship, Mitnick was able
to pump the employee for all kinds of information (Mitnick and Simon, 2002).
This trigger fits well with the persuasion principle that Cialdini terms liking (Cialdini,
2001). Liking is described as a positive connection between people, and can be fostered in a
number of ways including physical attractiveness, similarity, compliments and cooperation
(Cialdini, 2001). This principle and the trigger of deceptive relationships are based on the
same desired attitudes from the individual, and can be considered one and the same.
The fifth trigger Gragg describes is the diffusion of responsibility and moral duty, a
technique where the social engineer manipulates the target into believing that he or she will
not be held solely responsible for his or her actions and that those actions will have a
significant positive consequence, such as saving an employee or helping the company
(Gragg, 2003). This trigger is one where the victim realizes the action being solicited is
against policy or otherwise prohibited, but proceeds anyway because of a perceived greater
benefit. Based on this description, this trigger does not appear to have a corresponding
principle of persuasion.
The sixth trigger described by Gragg is response to authority. This is a technique that
preys on an individual’s propensity to respond and comply with someone who claims to be an
authority figure (Gragg, 2003).

Compounding the effectiveness of this trigger is that

verifying the legitimacy of the authority is considered a challenge, and one that most people
are not willing to make. Organizations with very rigid hierarchal structures are particularly
vulnerable to this type of attack, the military being the most obvious example. A social
engineer might exploit this trigger by pretending to be a high-ranking officer in the military,
or some other authority figure and simply request the information he desires. This trigger is
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another example of one that overlaps perfectly with one of Cialdini’s principles of
persuasion. Cialdini’s principle notes that it is common to seek expert advice, and specific
symbols of authorities such as uniforms and professional titles only serve to enhance the
effect (Cialdini, 2001).
Finally, the last psychological trigger that Gragg describes is integrity and consistency,
which takes advantage of the target’s desire to follow through on commitments in order to
manipulate them into performing some action (Gragg, 2003). This technique targets an
individual’s perceived obligation to follow through on promises, even if the promises made
were not their own. For example, if an employee were to go on vacation and a perpetrator
presented a victim with a promise by the employee to provide specific information, the victim
will often give up the information if they can be convinced (or convince themselves) the
promise was legitimate. This trigger also covers the nature of people to trust others because
they believe the person is telling the truth, based on their own tendency towards honesty.
This last psychological trigger matches Cialdini’s principle of persuasion of commitment and
consistency, which is linked to an individual’s desire to be, or at least appear to be, consistent
(Cialdini, 2001). Cialdini notes that this desire is even stronger when a person’s values are
identified first. For this principle to work well, an initial commitment has to be obtained, and
a social engineer could exploit this using reciprocation, or overloading.
4.2

Comparing Definitions of Illegitimate Persuasion and Social Engineering
The definitions used for comparing illegitimate persuasion and social engineering were

taken from two of the most influential articles about each subject. Dr. Sagarin’s and his
colleagues’ definition of illegitimate persuasion was used in order to be consistent, as his
article was the basis of this comparison. Sagarin defines illegitimate persuasion as “messages
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that seek to convince through deceptive tactics” (Sagarin et al., 2002). In the article that
Gragg describes the psychological triggers of social engineering, he defines social
engineering as “the process of deceiving people into giving away access or confidential
information” (Gragg, 2003).
When comparing Gragg’s definition of social engineering and Sagarin’s definition of
illegitimate persuasion, what immediately jumps out from these two definitions is that
deception is fundamental to both. Sagarin’s definition of illegitimate persuasion implies that
the deception is purposeful and intentional, while Gragg’s definition of social engineering
leaves less room for interpretation. By his definition, social engineering is a designed,
purposeful “process” that leaves no doubt about whether the social engineer has a malicious
intent and design to achieving his goal. Illegitimate persuasion’s definition, however, does
not define a malicious intent to this degree. While social engineering’s definition definitely
implies a malicious intent and illegitimate persuasion’s definition does not, the fundamental
premise to both is deception.

When developing a training program against social

engineering, the goal of that program is to get the user/participant to recognize when they are
being deceived, so finding that deception is fundamental to illegitimate persuasion as well is
positive, and allows the next comparison to be made.
4.3

Comparing Objectives and Targets
Next, an examination was made on the relationship between the objectives and targets of

illegitimate persuasion and social engineering. In all three of their experiments, Sagarin and
his colleagues had their participants examine full-page color advertisements from periodical
magazines with authority figures peddling their products (Sagarin et al., 2002). The objective
of illegitimate persuasion in the context in which Sagarin describes it (advertising) is to
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convince the individual who receives the message to purchase a particular product or service.
The distinction between a legitimate and illegitimate advertisement was made based on
whether the individual recommending the product had reasonable credentials to do so. For
example, a model dressed as a stockbroker recommending the Wall Street Journal was
labeled as an illegitimate authority, as he was not an expert on the product he was trying to
sell. Alternately, a legitimate authority was seen as someone who did have expert credentials
for the product they were selling, such as Marcel Cockaerts, President of Kredietbank,
Brussels recommending insurance for banks (Sagarin et al., 2002). Social engineering’s
objective by definition is to convince an individual to voluntarily give away some sort of
access or critical information.

The objectives of social engineering and illegitimate

persuasion clearly cannot be equated on this basis, however breaking the objectives down to
their core may allow for a more direct comparison.

Illegitimate persuasion and social

engineering both seek to compel behavior that the individual likely would not have taken
otherwise. The desired behavior of the recipient is different, but ultimately the objective of
both is to persuade and individual to take an action, and in that way the objectives are very
much aligned. So, while the objectives of illegitimate persuasion and social engineering are
not exactly alike, they do appear to be similar enough that it still stands to reason that
research shown to be effective in bolstering a resistance to illegitimate persuasion can be
applied to social engineering. Once the objectives were compared, the next step was to
examine the targets.
The target of an illegitimate persuasion attempt is the advertising audience at which the
marketing campaign is directed. In the experiments that Sagarin and his colleagues ran, the
targets that were chosen to be subject to illegitimate and legitimate authority advertisements
included the demographic of undergraduate college students (Sagarin et al., 2002).
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Advertisements are often targeted to reach a very specific demographic, and the
advertisements reflect the values and desires of the targeted demographic. The target of a
social engineering attack is an individual with specific information (or access to that
information) that the social engineer desires.

A social engineer may target a specific

individual, or may “shotgun” an attack out to a broad audience. The latter example describes
when a social engineer’s target is most like the target of an advertisement that uses
illegitimate persuasion. However, because the social engineer’s only target may be a specific
individual and the goal of an advertisement is to reach as broad an audience as possible
within a given demographic, the targets of social engineering and illegitimate persuasion
cannot be completely equated. Indeed, the targets of the persuasion attempt may be the
single biggest difference between illegitimate persuasion and social engineering. For the
purposes of applying the techniques of bolstering resistance to illegitimate persuasion to
social engineering, this difference is acceptable because the techniques are not exclusive to a
particular demographic or class of individuals. At this point, a comparison has been made
between the definitions, objectives, and targets of illegitimate persuasion and social
engineering. Next, comparison was made between the methods of the two.
4.4

Comparing Methods & Techniques
Sagarin’s research on bolstering resistance focused on the methods used to illegitimately

persuade, so in order to be able to apply his methods of bolstering resistance to social
engineering, the methods used to accomplish both were compared.

The psychological

aspects of two specific examples of illegitimate persuasion were evaluated to determine if
they fall within one of the known psychological triggers of social engineering (Gragg, 2003).
If the techniques used in these illegitimate persuasion examples use Cialdini’s principles of
persuasion that have been equated to Gragg’s psychological triggers from social engineering,
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then the techniques that have been shown to be effective in bolstering an individual’s
resistance to illegitimate persuasion should be effective against those same principles when
the desire is to prevent social engineering.
4.4.1

Authority Techniques

When describing the techniques on how to bolster an individual’s resistance to
illegitimate persuasion, Sagarin and his colleagues used two types of situations to dispel the
individual’s illusion of invulnerability (Sagarin et al., 2002). In the first example, the first of
a series of three experiments gave the participants rules about determining the legitimacy of
authority-based appeals and investigated whether or not that led to an increase in resistance
against illegitimate appeals.

The first experiment measured the participants’ resistance

immediately after being shown the difference between illegitimate and legitimate
advertisements, while the second experiment repeated the first experiment and measured the
participant’s responses after one to four days.

The third experiment differed from the

previous two in that, when a participant incorrectly described the illegitimate authority as
legitimate, the error was pointed out to the participant. What all three of these experiments
had in common was that each asked the participants to differentiate between a legitimate
authority figure, such as a doctor recommending a pain killer; and an illegitimate authority
figure, such as an actor dressed as a stock broker recommending a particular trading firm.
This persuasion appeal clearly uses Cialdini’s principle of authority as it appeals to the idea
that the individual recommending the product has a clear, demonstrated expertise in the
domain of the advertisement. Similarly, social engineers use an appeal to authority, which
has already been linked to Cialdini’s persuasion principle of authority through Gragg’s
trigger of authority, to manipulate a victim into giving up sensitive information. A classic
example of a social engineer using authority is when they claim to be technical support, either
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over the phone or in person. Because the dispelling of illusion of invulnerability techniques
were shown to be most effective at instilling a resistance against an authority-based
illegitimate persuasion attempt and because the persuasion principle of authority and the
social engineering trigger of authority have been shown to be one and the same, those same
dispelling of illusion techniques should also be effective at instilling a resistance against the
social engineering trigger of authority.
4.4.2

Scarcity Techniques

In a different study on illegitimate persuasion, the principle of persuasion that the study
focused on building a resistance against was the principle of scarcity (Coutinho and Sagarin,
2007). In this experiment, Coutinho and Sagarin examined how participants responded to
legitimate and illegitimate claims of scarcity, and determined whether the principles of
dispelling the illusion of invulnerability would be as effective as in the experiment done on
authority. The experiment gave the participants the rule that in order for there to be a
legitimate claim of scarcity, it must be apparent that the object could not be produced
anymore (such as coins from the 1800s).

The experiment used Cialdini’s persuasion

principle of scarcity to elicit an emotional response from the target that created a sense of
urgency to purchase the item. For the experiment, participants were randomly assigned into
four groups and each participant was given a series of six advertisements, balanced with three
illegitimate scarcity claims and three legitimate scarcity claims. The four groups were then
assigned one of the four following conditions: the control group which received no training;
the asserted vulnerability group, which received guidance on how to distinguish between a
legitimate scarcity claim and an illegitimate scarcity claim, but received no demonstration of
their personal vulnerability, and were not surveyed on how convincing they found the
advertisement; the asserted vulnerability with inquiry condition group which was the same as
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the asserted vulnerability group, with the exception they were surveyed on how convincing
they found each advertisement; and the demonstrated vulnerability treatment group, which
were surveyed on how convincing they found the advertisement, and were then told they had
been fooled by any illegitimate advertisement they found convincing and given training on
how to distinguish between an illegitimate scarcity claim and a legitimate one. A summary
of the assigned group and the conditions given to each is shown in Figure 4.

FIGURE 4: SCARCITY EXPERIMENT GROUPS AND TREATMENTS

After reading the training material, participants then rated six more advertisements to
assess on how persuasive the advertisement was and how much the participant perceived an
undo manipulative intent. Again, these advertisements were balanced with three legitimate
scarcity claims and three illegitimate scarcity claims. The result of the experiment found that
the participants of the demonstrated vulnerability treatment group were far more resistant to
scarcity claims than the participants of the other groups. This confirms the results of the
earlier experiments using the principle of authority. As shown above, the scarcity principle
of persuasion can be equated to the strong affect trigger of social engineering, and so the
results of this experiment should be able to be extended towards instilling a resistance to
social engineering. Furthermore, the result from this experiment suggests that the technique
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of dispelling an individual’s illusion of invulnerability is necessary to instill a resistance to
any of the principles of persuasion, and by extension, the triggers of social engineering.
4.5

The Conclusion: Illegitimate Persuasion = Social Engineering
While illegitimate persuasion and social engineering cannot be exactly equated, the

principles of persuasion are very similar to the psychological triggers of social engineering,
and it reasonably follows that techniques that have been shown to be effective at reducing an
individual’s resistance to illegitimate persuasion will also be effective in reducing an
individual’s vulnerability to social engineering. By extension, it follows that a combination
of comprehensive security policies, combined with training that incorporates into its
curriculum a dispelling of an individual’s illusion of invulnerability, is fundamental and
necessary to protecting an organization from being exploited by social engineering attacks.
The application of this conclusion to social engineering represents a significant paradigm
shift on how information security specialists approach the task of training users to resist
social engineering attacks. Rather than simply educating users on the dangers and methods
of social engineers, the individual needs to be exposed to training that demonstrates that
user’s personal vulnerability in order for the training to be effective. The question then
becomes: How do you design a training program that is effective in demonstrating to the user
their personal vulnerability to a social engineering attack?
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V. Discussion
The previous chapter focused on determining whether or not illegitimate persuasion could be
equated to social engineering. This chapter examines the principles necessary to apply these
principles to a training program that instills a resistance to social engineering. The
Constructivist Learning Theory is reviewed as it was a suggested method by Coutinho and
Sagarin as a potential training technique that would be well suited to the task of incorporating
the principle of dispelling the illusion of invulnerability into a training program (Coutinho
and Sagarin, 2007). Other potential training techniques are also reviewed for their potential
applicability. Then the requisite skill level described by Bloom’s Taxonomy that an
individual would need to be trained up to is examined. Finally, some suggested methods that
incorporate training techniques with the requisite skill level, and that apply the principle of
dispelling the illusion of invulnerability training are given.
5.1

Constructivist Theory and Its Applicability
Coutinho and Sagarin argued that a training program built on the Constructivist Learning

Theory was the best way of building a training program built on the technique of dispelling
an individual’s illusion of invulnerability (Coutinho and Sagarin, 2007). This approach does
seem logical as the Constructivist Learning Theory is built on the premise that students learn
through experience and that each new experience builds on their own existing knowledge
learned from experience. A training program based on this learning theory would use the
dispelling the illusion of invulnerability technique to construct a new experience or set of
experiences that would build on the trainee’s own set of experiences by demonstrating that
individual’s specific vulnerability.

Training based on the Constructivist Learning Theory

would incorporate examples of social engineering into scenarios based on each of the seven
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different psychological triggers, and then build on those triggers by demonstrating common
ways the triggers can be used in combination. An example of such a combination might be
using the strong affect trigger to get a small commitment from an individual to give up an
innocuous bit of information, and then exploiting that commitment by using the trigger of
integrity and consistency to gain access to information that is more protected. A training
program that incorporates scenarios such as this into its curriculum would give the individual
receiving the training the opportunity to construct a new set of experiences that he or she
would retain and apply in their day-to-day life and job.
5.2

Other Training Techniques
While the principle of dispelling the illusion of invulnerability may be best implemented

by techniques build on the Constructivist Learning Theory, it would be impractical to build a
scenario for each possible technique that an individual might be approached by someone
attempting to perpetrate a social engineering attack.

Such training should serve as a

technique to make the individual more receptive to an education that also incorporates pattern
recognition and the ability to evaluate a situation for its potential for a social engineering
attack to take place.

Current methods of informing individuals on the threat of social

engineering as well as the techniques used by social engineers certainly have their place in a
training program designed to reduce an individual’s vulnerability to social engineering.
5.3

Bloom’s Taxonomy, Its Revision, and Its Applicability
It should also be considered as to what level of skill is necessary for an individual to gain

as a result of going through a training program designed to instill a resistance to social
engineering. Bloom’s Taxonomy is a universally recognized framework for classifying what
is expected of students as the result of instruction.
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Bloom’s Taxonomy describes the

following six levels of competency, in order from lowest to highest complexity: knowledge,
comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluate. In 2001, Krathwohl introduced
a revised version of Bloom’s Taxonomy that changed the terms into gerunds to better
describe the expected ability of the student at each level, and swapped the order of synthesis
and evaluate, as synthesis is widely regarded as the highest level of competency an individual
can achieve (Krathwohl, 2002). Krathwohl’s revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy describes the
following six levels of competency in order of complexity, from lowest to highest: remember,
understand, apply, analyze, evaluate, and create. A comparison of the original taxonomy and
Krathwohl’s revision can be seen in Figure 5.

FIGURE 5: BLOOM’S ORIGINAL AND REVISED TAXONOMY (LOWEST TO HIGHEST)

Currently, the typical educational program for preventing a social engineering attack
expects its students to leave simply with an increased awareness about the techniques and
tactics that social engineers employ. In the revised taxonomy, the level of competency that
such programs teach to is the understand level. While this initially seems sufficient, the
implications of Sagarin’s and Coutinho’s research described above are that rule-giving is not
enough, and that it must be demonstrated to the individual that they are personally vulnerable.
This demonstration actually educates the user to a higher level of competency, the evaluate
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competency. Once their vulnerability has been demonstrated for them, the individual can
then make judgments based on established criteria and evaluate each new situation that is
presented to them. Therefore, the target level of competency for training that seeks to instill a
resistance against social engineering should be the evaluate competency.
5.4

What should be in a Training Program
Security policies must be able to identify critical information that needs to be protected.

Why the information is being protected must make sense to the user, and then formal rules
must be put in place that forbids the user to release the identified critical information. There
must be “buy-in” from the user that there is an urgency to protect the information, and this
can be achieved through training. A potential training example might be to give the user a
series of questions to determine whether or not specific information was ok to release. The
sample set should include obvious examples, such as username and password, and then
innocuous examples such as the individual’s name and rank.
User/employee training should include samples of behavior and information that might
appear to be innocuous, but in fact are not. When they incorrectly choose an action or
information that has been identified as critical, the training should immediately demonstrate
or present an historical example of how that that type of activity was used to perform
malicious activities. This type of training uses the technique of dispelling a user’s illusion of
invulnerability to create a salient, teachable moment that can affect cognitive processes and
ultimately their influence behavior so that they increase their vigilance.
Critical to this training is that employees are demonstrated two things: First, everyone,
regardless of their position within the organization, is vulnerable to a range of social
engineering techniques. Secondly, each person must be made aware that the social engineer
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is targeting people just like him or her. The salience of the demonstration as well as evidence
of the individual’s vulnerability will bolster that individual’s resistance to social engineering
attacks in the future. In order to effectively create a resistance to a variety of attacks, this
technique should be demonstrated to the user across all the psychological triggers of social
engineering.
5.5

Limitations of Applicability & Potential for Future Research
The finding of this thesis, and the effectiveness of any training program created to

incorporate this research depends largely on the ability of previous research done on
dispelling the illusion of invulnerability against two different principles of persuasion.
Applying the principle of dispelling the illusion of invulnerability to principles of persuasion
other than authority and scarcity has not been performed, and thus the potential exists that the
techniques may not be effective against six principles, much less all seven psychological
triggers. With that said, more research is definitely required in this area.
If a means of measuring an individual’s vulnerability to social engineering can be
developed, then a study that verifies the effectiveness of this type of training when applied to
social engineering would add validity to this study and to the transferability of Sagarin’s
work to the problem of countering social engineering attacks. Perhaps such research could
incorporate methods of measuring resistance from Sagarin’s work and apply them to social
engineering. Research that measures an individual’s resistance prior to treatment, gives them
a treatment, and then measures their resistance post treatment would help validate the
concepts from this study. A longitudinal study that determines the rate of decay of training,
and how long the treatment is effective for would also be useful for determining how often
individuals have to be subjected to training.
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